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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERLE HINDS COMP ANY, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THR INDUSTRIAL COl\L\llS-
SION OF UTAH, UN IT ED 
STATES FIDE LI TY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
PHILIP M. RALEIGH COM-
P 1tNY and HAROLD llA VVDEN, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Case No. 
10891 
APPEAL .FROl\I THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of an 
alleged accident arising out of or in the course of em-
ployment. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The matter was heard by the Industrial Couunis-
siou and referred to a .l\ledical Panel. The Industrial 
Commission made its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Award on February 16, 1967, which 
Award was favorable to Applicant, Harold Bawden. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Merle Hinds, Inc., seeks reversal of 
the Industrial Commission's Award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Applicant Harold Bawden filed a claim with the 
Industrial Commission on February 14, 1966, for a 
disability allegedly due to alleged accident which is 
said to have occurred on or about April 30, 1965. (R. 1). 
Applicant subsequently underwent surgery at the 
Latter-day Saints Hospital in Salt Lake City. Such 
surgery was performed by Dr. Sam Taylor. Applicant 
was initially confined between May 9, 1965 and May 
15, 1965. (R. 113). Applicant was readmitted to the 
hospital May 19, 1965 and was released July 20, 191.i5. 
(R. 112). 
Harold Bawden has made conflicting statements 
regarding the origin of the injury on which he bases 
his claim. Applicant, during the hearing before the 
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Industrial Commission, stated that he had no injury 
prior to April 30, 1965 and that on that date he experi-
enced a warm sensation in his right knee while stoopiug 
to read a label. (R. 30). However, on at least three 
other occasions, Applicant stated that he had injured 
his knee at home (R. 149, 116 and 117). 
Applicant was hired as a commissiou salesman 
( R. 28 and 29) who solicited orders on his own initiatiYe 
and at his own discretion. He used his own automobile 
for which he was not compensated. (R. 29). He was, 
at the time of the alleged accident, performing actiYi-
ties uuusual to his job. (R. 31, 167). He did not come 
in rnntact with anyone or anything, nor was he lifting 
any object or objects. ( R. 30, 31). Applicant following 
the alleged accident, delivered some of the orders but 
has not otherwise returned to work for the Plaintiff 
:\Ierle Hinds, Inc., since the alleged accident. (R. 32). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBI-
TRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY FAILED 
TO MAKE CRRTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT 
AS HEQUIRED BY LA \V. 
Section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated 1953, re-
quires: 
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
duty of the commission to make findings of fact 
auci co11clusio11s of law ... " 
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Plaintiff Merle Hinds, Inc., placed squarely before 
the Industrial Commission the issue of whether an 
"accident", as defined by the workmen's compensation 
laws of the State of Utah, had in fad occurred, by the 
following language at page 45: 
".1\Ir. Mock: And do you also have before you 
the question as to whether an accident did or 
did not occur? 
The Referee: This is the issue that will be re-
solved bv the Commission. But the Panel will 
be instr~cted to assume that some type of an 
event or accident occurred. Thev don't decide. 
They assume. And they relate ~ny subsequent 
medical causation to that, or lack of medical 
causation." 
And again at page 100: 
"Mr. Mock: Is there a preliminary hearing 
regarding whether or not there was an accident? 
The Referee: No, there will not be. But the 
issue of the coverage will have to be resoh-ed at 
the time of the final Order of the Commission." 
The Industrial Commission recognized that the 
primary issue was whether or not an "accident" occurred 
and, if so, whether such accident was in the course 
of the Applicant's employment. (R. 167). However, 
in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Award, the Commission glossed over the two parts of 
this prime issue in utter disregard of the followi11g 
facts: 
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I. That applicant was a comm1ss1on salesman 
who was not subject to Plaintiff Merle 
Hinds, lnc.'s control as defined by section 
35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated (1953). (R. 
10, 11, and 30). Therefore, Applicant was an 
independent contractor. 
2. That applicant was engaged in an activity 
unusual to him and not part of his duty as a 
salesman. (R. 167, 43). 
3. That no definable "accident" in fact occurred. 
(R. 179). 
As to Fact No. 1, above, the terms of employment 
and the means of compensation are almost identical to 
the facts of Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commis-
~ion, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, 1028, where this Court 
stated: 
"There was no written contract ... Knudsen 
was supposed to sell plaintiff's products ... He 
was not specifically limited as to territory ... He 
received no instructions as to where he should 
go, and when he should go, or how he should 
conduct his work. He furnished his own means 
of transportation, paid all his own expenses, 
and used his own judgment concerning what 
trips he should make and when he should make 
them. Mr. Stover, of the plaintiff company, tes-
tified that he had no right to control deceased's 
moyements or manner of doing his work-and 
that he did not in fact do so." 
As to Fact No. 2, above, the Commission found 
(page 167, the official record): 
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( T) he Hearing Examiner finds that tlu, 
Applicant, on the date in question, was engaged 
in activities unusual to him; i.e., assisting iu 
getting out an order. In so doing it required that 
he crouch low on his haunches in order to ex-
amine a low stocked row of merchandise." 
The Applicant was neither required to perform this 
function nor was he requested to do so. He voluntarily 
returned after loading his vehicle to the stock room 
to pick up some additional stock to fill an order of which 
he alone had knowledge. ( R. 30). He was not in the 
"course of his employment." 
As to Fact No. 3, above, the word "accident" a-; 
used in section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated ( l95B), 
should haYe its orclinar~- meaning. This Court in Pintar 
v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 
414, 415 (1963), stated: 
" . . . It is, therefore, a prerequisite to com-
pensation that his disability be shown to result 
... from an identifiable accident or accidents in 
the course of the e~n ployrnent." (Emphasis add-
ed). 
In a 1964 determination of the Industrial Commis-
sion under identical facts ( R. 177), with the exception 
that the Plaintiff l\Ierle Hinds, Inc., did not, at the 
time of the alleged "accident'', carry any workmen's 
compensation coYerage, the Commission found that 
there was no "definable accident." 
The Industrial Commission has not, contrary to 
the statutory charge, determined the real issne of 
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ll'hclher all "accident", meaning a definable accident in 
the course of employment covered by the \Vorkmen's 
Compensation Act, in fact occurred. Instead the Com-
mission has taken the Medical Panel's findings and 
incorporated them into the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Award, contrary to the Commission's 
own admissions. At page 4.5 of the official record, im-
mediatel~r preceding and following the quoted material 
011 page 4 of this brief, states: 
''Mr. Mock: May I ask for a point of infor-
motion regarding procedures at this time? 
'Vhether the connection of these injuries, and 
the various treatments that are shown on the 
records, is a matter for the Medical Board to 
consider? 
The Referee: I think so. I think the problem 
we have here is establishing the time and the 
onset of some occurrence, which has been nar-
rowed to the 30th of April. And the subsequent 
events would be evaluated by the Medical Panel, 
which the Commission will appoint. 
* * * 
l\Ir. Mock: The medics have no prerogative 
to decide whether or not there was an accident. 
The Referee: They are specifically instructed 
that they do not have that prerogative." 
And again at page lfi8 of the record it states: 
"The Hearing Examiner, in adopting the 
Medical Panel Report and its findings, therein 
finds: ... " 
The Medical Panel then assumes, but without any 
basis for so assuming, what the Commission had in-
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structed the Medical Panel to assume. ( R. 15G). Th(' 
"adoption" of the findings of the Medical Panel Report 
is arbitrary, capricious and directly contrary to thl' 
responsibilities of the Commission. The information 
and evidence elicited from the Commission at the time 
of the hearing also clearly stated this responsibility. 
(R. 45, 60 and 168). . 
This "adoption'' of the Medical Panel Report 
assnmes that an "accident" occurred. By the record i11 
this case, the .Medical Panel was instructed to ass11111c 
an "accident" had in fact occurred. ( R. 165). The 
"adoption" therefore shifts to the Medical Panel, h.1 
way of instruction, the burden and responsibility to 
actually determine by assumption the facts and co11-
clusions of law which are the responsibility of the Com-
mission under section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBI-
TRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED 
A DIFFERENT STANDARD TO A "N'ON-
COVERAGE" CASE. 
The Industrial Commission in the case entitled 
Dal ilfar TV. Davis v. KUTV, Inc., and The Stutc 
Insurance Fund, claim no. 6147 (R. 177) held that the 
Applicant therein did not have an "accident" since 
"Applicant lifted no weight. He did not slip or fall. The 
8 
cable incident required no unusual exertion." In that 
case the Applicant stooped down in a squatting position 
to either plug in or disengage an electrical plug from 
a socket. The Commission concluded by stating: "The 
Commission finds that the claimed injury did not arise 
out of or in the course of his employment because he 
did not have a definable accident." (R. 177). 
The facts in the present case are identical to that 
of the KUTV case except herein Merle Hinds, Inc., 
<lid not, contrary to its belief (R. 80), have workmen's 
compensation coverage at the time of the alleged acci-
dent. The statute requires that the same standard 
must be applied to non-coverage cases. Section 35-1-57, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides for certain 
penalties . for non-coverage cases. However, they are 
not applicable in this instance since Applicant elected 
to proceed against Plaintiff under section 35-1-58 
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) wherein it states: 
"Any employee ... may ... file his applica-
tion with the commission for compensation in 
accordance with the terms of this title, and the 
commission shall hear and determine such appli-
cation as in other cases .. . ,, (Emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission failed to make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to its statutory 
charge. The Commission improperly delegated this 
authority and duty to an instructed Medical Panel. 
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'fhe instructions to the Medical Panel required the 
assumption of an "accident" in course of employmeut. 
The Commission never made any findings on such basic 
issue. An Award, without such findings, is clear and 
conclusive evidence of arbitrary and capricious action. 
Even had the Commission made such findings, it would 
have been applying a '"double standard", contrary to 
statutory law, and inconsistent with other actions by 
the Commission on identical issues. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Award of tlic 
Industrial Commission heretofore entered in this case 
should be reversed and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NESLEN AND MOCK 
H. Byron Mock and 
James R. Brown 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Merle Hinds, Inc. 
1000 Continental Bank Bl<lg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
10 
